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KASSOUF—THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S 
MISGUIDED ATTEMPT TO REIN IN THE 
IRS 
BRIAN VALCARCE* 
The omnibus clause of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) is a catch-all provision that 
broadly punishes people who corruptly endeavor to obstruct administration 
of the Internal Revenue Code.  The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Kassouf, 
improperly limited conviction under the omnibus clause to cases where the 
defendant had knowledge of a pending IRS investigation (a nexus test).  The 
Sixth Circuit is the only circuit today applying this rule, with most others 
expressly or impliedly rejecting it. 
Even though the Sixth Circuit is an outlier in applying a nexus test, there 
has been pervasive discussion of the issue recently.  There has been a 
significant increase in circuit court decisions with some judges and 
commentators staunchly opposing the majority view.  Those in opposition to 
the majority argue that a nexus test is necessary to limit the IRS from abusing 
a statute that could expand to criminalizing any wrong act in a tax setting as 
a felony.  Recent claims of the IRS abusing its power lend particular weight 
to this fear of statutory overreach. In fact, after the original draft of this 
article was written, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Marinello v. 
United States and heard oral argument on this very issue in December 2017. 
This Comment argues that § 7212(a) is unambiguous and contains no 
statutory requirement of a nexus test. It recommends how the Supreme Court 
should resolve the issue, by limiting omnibus clause charges to affirmative 
acts just as other Title 26 felonies are limited.  It further argues why Congress 
 
* B.S., Utah Valley University, 2010, Summa Cum Laude; M.S., University of Utah, 2011; 
J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 2018.  Thank you to 
everyone on the JCLC staff who put time and effort into editing this Comment.  I would like 
to especially thank Yehuda Ness who went above and beyond in providing very thoughtful 
and useful feedback during the writing process and Elizabeth Bright who was extremely 
patient with my lengthy and exhaustive edits as the legal landscape surrounding this Comment 
shifted more in the last year than I could have possibly imagined.      
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should act expediently to modify § 7212(a).  Limiting the omnibus clause 
beyond its plain meaning is necessary for fair notice and to prevent felony 
charges for action meant to be punished as a misdemeanor.  Congressional 
action is sorely needed in this area of the law where the stakes are high.** 
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should do.  Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144, 2018 WL 1402426 (U.S. 2018).  In a 
surprising 7–2 opinion, the Court overturned the Second Circuit and made Kassouf’s nexus 
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Comment may be less relevant in advocating for judicial interpretation, the discussion is still 
important in terms of policy making and legislating.  This Comment demonstrates that the 
Court, while creating precedent that might be good policy, did not correctly interpret 
legislative intent.  In that sense, the plea for Congressional action is now more relevant than 
ever. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Kassouf,1 the Sixth Circuit held that a “nexus test” is 
required to convict an individual for criminal tax obstruction under the 
“omnibus clause” of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).  The § 7212(a) omnibus clause 
makes it a felony for any individual who “in any other way [other than 
through intimidation or impedance of a tax officer or employee] corruptly or 
by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or 
communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, 
the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].”2  Kassouf held that 
in order to convict a person of violating the omnibus clause, that person must 
be aware of an ongoing investigation or proceeding against them.3  Kassouf’s 
requirement that a person have this awareness has been referred to as a 
“nexus” test.4  Other circuits have resisted Kassouf’s holding, and confusion 
exists even within the Sixth Circuit about whether or not Kassouf is still good 
law.5 
Kassouf imposed a nexus test on omnibus clause violations 
notwithstanding over fifty years of precedent convictions which applied no 
such test to the statute.6  The court’s main concern was policy: that without a 
nexus test, the omnibus clause “would open [people] up to a host of potential 
liability of conduct that is not specifically proscribed.”7  Since Kassouf, 
courts that have rejected the nexus requirement have been accused of 
 
1  144 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 1998). 
2  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012). 
3  Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 956–58. 
4  Id. at 956–57. 
5  See infra Part II (explaining the circuit split).  
6  See infra Section I.C. (outlining the history of the omnibus clause).  
7  Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 957. 
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allowing omnibus clause charges to “expand almost infinitely to reach all 
misconduct that is in any way tax-related,”8 and of providing an “overzealous 
or partisan prosecutor [an easy path to] investigate, to threaten, to force into 
pleading, or perhaps (with luck) to convict anybody.”9  What started as a 
moderate concern from the Kassouf court has since become the aim of more 
aggressive predictions from those who seem worried that the government is 
going to use § 7212(a) to punish everyone who so much as forgets to properly 
store their annual Form 1040.  In this way, the imagined slope of 
prosecutorial abuse of § 7212(a) has been becoming more slippery as 
warnings of omnibus clause abuse grow direr.  This concern is 
understandable given the somewhat recent concern of abuse of power by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).10  However, this Comment principally 
argues that the Kassouf test, whether or not good policy, is not a correct 
interpretation of § 7212(a). 
The arguments and suggestions proposed in this Comment articulate 
much needed guidance on an issue that is now regularly dividing courts.  In 
just over three years, five different circuit courts have issued opinions on this 
issue.11  One of these opinions attempted to clarify the now confusing 
precedent within the Sixth Circuit.12  Another resulted in a forceful dissent to 
an en banc hearing request13 and a granted petition to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.14 This Comment offers not only the first comprehensive analysis of 
almost two decades of case law since the Kassouf holding, but more 
importantly, it makes the case about why Kassouf should be overruled by the 
Supreme Court while maintaining a different but more important limiting 
principle. It concludes by advocating for change which can and should only 
be initiated through the legislative process, by Congress. It advises Congress 
as to two potential minor alterations to § 7212(a) that could meaningfully 
 
8  Robert S. Fink & Caroline Rule, The Growing Epidemic of Section 7212(a) Prosecutions 
– Is Congress the Only Cure?, 88 J. TAX’N 356, 356 (1998).  
9  United States v. Marinello, 855 F.3d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc) 
(Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
10  See John D. McKinnon & Siobhan Hughes, FBI Launches Probe of IRS, WALL ST. J. 
(May 14, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732421600457848320315 
3773048 (describing investigation into IRS practice of inappropriately questioning politically 
conservative organizations applying for tax-exempt status).   
11  United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Marinello, 
839 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
12  See generally Miner, 774 F.3d 336. 
13  Marinello, 855 F.3d at 455 (denying rehearing en banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
14  Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (U.S. June 27, 2017) 
(No. 16-1144). 
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limit its scope. 
This Comment proceeds as follows: it begins in Part I by providing a 
brief overview of criminal obstruction statutes and tax crimes to give a 
general background. It then focuses specifically on the U.S. tax obstruction 
statute, § 7212, and discusses its omnibus clause.  As part of the discussion 
of § 7212 and its omnibus clause, this Comment briefly discusses the 
legislative history of the provision followed by noting how courts have 
narrowed the mens rea term “corruptly.” 
Part II of this Comment reviews the important circuit court decisions 
that have resulted in the conflict presently plaguing courts.  It begins by 
describing how the Kassouf court, in what it deemed to be an issue of first 
impression, interpreted the omnibus clause to include a nexus test.  It then 
lists and discusses the many circuit court decisions that have declined to 
follow the Kassouf holding.  It also underscores the confusion within the 
Sixth Circuit.  Part III presents arguments discussing why Kassouf was 
wrongly decided. Part IV advocates for solutions.  It advises the Supreme 
Court to reject Kassouf and limit the omnibus clause to criminalizing 
affirmative acts.  It then implores Congress to act, by considering what 
function the omnibus clause should serve within the statutory scheme of 
criminal tax obstruction and by suggesting minor changes Congress could 
make to improve the statutory language. 
I. THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE OF SECTION 7212 
There are many different obstruction statutes that exist within the U.S. 
Code, including § 7212(a).  The different statutes have many similarities but 
also some stark differences.  An understanding of the background of 
obstruction crimes and tax crimes generally is necessary to fully comprehend 
§ 7212(a) and the role it serves in punishing tax obstruction. 
A. CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION IN THE U.S. CODE 
Obstruction is “[t]he act of impeding or hindering something” or 
“interference.”15  Obstruction statutes criminalize an individual for 
“impeding or hindering” some governmental function.16  Various obstruction 
statutes exist, most within Title 18 of the U.S. Code.17  Each of these sections 
 
15  Obstruction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
16  See John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American 
Criminal Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49, 51 (2004) (listing the following examples of obstruction: 
“treason, sedition, perjury, bribery, escape, contempt, false personation, destruction of 
government property, and assault of a public official . . .”).   
17  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012) (protecting individuals administering federal 
processes within the three branches of the U.S. government). 
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falls within Chapter 73, which defines the crime of “obstruction of justice.”18  
Other obstruction statutes exist outside of Title 18, but often serve the same 
function of protecting government processes.19  Some of the Title 18 sections 
are construed broadly to punish any acts that encumber the official activities 
of government agents.20  They often focus explicitly on obstructive use of 
force or a type of written threat against another individual.21  However, some 
also contain a catch-all word or phrase, ensuring that the statutes are not 
limited to only physical or written actions.22 
Specifically, obstruction of justice is most commonly prosecuted 
through 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and involves demonstrating proof of three 
elements: (1) a pending judicial proceeding, (2) defendant’s knowledge of 
the proceeding, and (3) obstruction.23 
How broadly or narrowly the obstruction statutes should be interpreted 
has been thoroughly debated within the federal judiciary and at the highest 
levels.24  Determining the knowledge requirement, i.e., mens rea, has been 
particularly problematic.25  One point of confusion for courts and prosecutors 
has been the use of the term “corruptly” to describe the mens rea for certain 
obstruction convictions.26  Early on, however, the Supreme Court attempted 
to clarify the issue by holding that obstruction-of-justice mens rea requires 
specific intent.27 Pettibone v. United States interpreted one of the earliest 
versions of what is now § 1503, stating “the specific intent to violate the 
statute must exist to justify a conviction, and this being so, the doctrine that 
there may be a transfer of intent in regard to crimes flowing from general 
malevolence has no applicability.”28 
 
18  Id. 
19  E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2012) (punishing obstruction of the Internal Revenue Code). 
20  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) (criminalizing the knowing and willful obstruction 
of a federal process server).   
21  See, e.g., id. § 1503 (making it unlawful to influence or injure court officers or jurors). 
22  See, e.g., id. § 1501 (2012) (punishing any individual that “assaults, beats, or wounds 
any officer or other person duly authorized,” but also including any obstruction, resistance, 
or opposition).   
23  See Leigh Ainsworth et al., Obstruction of Justice, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1551 (2016); 
Decker, supra note 16, at 54. 
24  E.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).  In a 5–4 vote, Yates reversed an 
obstruction of justice conviction within 18 U.S.C. § 1519, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
after a lengthy debate over the construction of the term “tangible object” within the statute.  
Id. at 1076.   
25  See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (where a divided Supreme Court 
debated the mens rea required for a conviction under § 1503). 
26  Decker, supra note 16, at 58.  
27  Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206–07 (1893). 
28  Id. at 207. 
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B. TAX CRIMES GENERALLY AND TAX OBSTRUCTION 
Most criminal violations of the tax code are prosecuted under one of 
three sections of the Internal Revenue Code.29  These three sections include 
two felonies (tax evasion30 and filing a false tax return31) as well as one 
misdemeanor: the “[w]illful failure to file [a tax] return, supply information, 
or pay tax.”32 
A criminal provision of the tax code that is becoming increasingly 
important is § 7212, titled “Attempts to interfere with administration of 
internal revenue laws.”33  It specifically criminalizes tax obstruction by 
individuals.34  Subsection (a) of the statute punishes (as a felony) an 
individual who does any of the following: 
[C]orruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or 
communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the 
United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly 
or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) 
obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this 
title.35 
This subsection separates into two clauses.  The first clause of § 7212(a) 
criminalizes using or threatening force against an IRS officer who is acting 
on official business.36  The second clause and the focus of this Comment, 
often referred to as the “omnibus clause” or the “catch-all” clause,37 includes 
any act that “in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force 
 
29  Dante Marrazzo, Practitioners-Beware the Trojan Horse: The Government 
Unsheathes an Old Weapon to Target Practitioners for Criminal Tax Offenses, 13 AKRON 
TAX J. 85, 86 (1997).  
30  See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) (titled “Attempt to evade or defeat tax”). 
31  See id. § 7206(1) (a subsection of “Fraud and False Statements”).  Crimes under this 
section have a three-year maximum prison sentence as opposed to five years for tax evasion.  
See id. §§ 7206, 7201.  
32  Id. § 7203. 
33  Id. § 7212.  
34  One author has hypothesized that all criminal violations in a tax setting are obstructive 
in nature and could generally be referred to as obstruction crimes.  See John A. Townsend, 
Tax Obstruction Crimes: Is Making the IRS’s Job Harder Enough?, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX 
L.J. 260, 264–65 (2009).  Townsend argues that all tax crimes involve “attempts to impair or 
impede the functioning of the IRS in the ascertainment or collection of tax liabilities.”  Id. at 
264.  He distinguishes them between what he calls the “substantive” tax crimes and two 
statutes used to punish tax obstruction: 26 U.S.C. § 7212 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (the so-
called “Klein conspiracy”).  Id.   
35  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).  Section 7212(a) includes a maximum prison sentence of three 
years if force is used or one year if the act consists of only threats of force. 
36  It punishes “[w]hoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any 
threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or 
employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title . . .” Id.  
37  E.g., United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998). 
VALCARCE_TECHNICALREVIEW2.0 4/13/18  11:06 AM 
342 VALCARCE [Vol. 108 
(including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or 
endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal 
Revenue Code].”38 
C. HISTORY OF SECTION 7212 AND THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE 
Section 7212 has its roots in the Revenue Act of 1862, where § 7212’s 
predecessor originally served as a means to punish forceful interference with 
tax collectors.39  What came to be known as the omnibus clause was included 
over ninety years later in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.40  The 
legislative history of its enactment is short, and for the most part, 
unrevealing.41  Some have speculated that the omnibus clause language was 
drawn directly from the omnibus clause of the federal obstruction of justice 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, since the wording is nearly identical.42 
For the first few decades after the enactment of § 7212’s predecessor, 
prosecutors took a more cautious approach than they currently take when 
using the omnibus clause.43  The clause was dormant in criminal tax 
convictions until 1981, when, in United States v. Williams, it was used to 
convict three men of filing false withholding exemption certificates.44  
Whether because prosecutors felt more empowered to use the omnibus clause 
after Williams or because the IRS was looking for new tools to battle 
increasing tax fraud, the clause started to be used on a much more regular 
basis after Williams was decided.45 
 
38  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). 
39  Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 28, 12 Stat. 432, 444 (1862); Marrazzo, supra note 
29, at 87.  
40  Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7212(a), 68A Stat. 851, 855 (1954); United 
States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 n.12 (8th Cir. 1981); Marrazzo, supra note 29, at 88.  
41  See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 604 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 
5254 (mainly discussing differences in punishment between when the crime involves force 
and when it involves threats of force and comparing the statute with 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2012), 
which does not include “threats of force” as § 7212 does); H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at A427 
(1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4574-7 (making no mention of the omnibus 
clause).  
42  E.g., Townsend, supra note 34, at 283–84. 
43  See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(detailing the government’s argument that § 7212(a) “applies only to acts or threats of 
physical violence . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
44  See United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that the 
court’s research had uncovered no case law applying the omnibus clause of § 7212(a)).  The 
court upheld the conviction as a legitimate use of the omnibus clause.  See id. at 701.   
45  See Marrazzo, supra note 29, at 89–90 (describing more frequent use § 7212(a) by 
prosecutors and explaining “[a]s tax fraud schemes became more complicated, more difficult 
to detect, and increasingly difficult to prosecute under the more familiar statutes, the 
government had to seek innovative approaches to combat tax scofflaws”).  The Marrazzo 
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D. REQUISITE MENS REA FOR OMNIBUS CLAUSE CONVICTIONS 
To prosecute an act not involving force or threats of force under 
§ 7212(a), Congress requires a showing that the act was done “corruptly.”46  
United States v. Reeves was the first case to apply “corruptly” to § 7212(a)’s 
omnibus clause and went into great detail to discern the legislative intent 
behind the language.47  Lester Reeves was convicted under § 7212 for filing 
a common law lien against a tax investigator.48  The Fifth Circuit reversed 
Reeves’s conviction, stating “[i]t is unlikely that ‘corruptly’ merely means 
‘intentionally’ or ‘with improper motive or bad or evil purpose.’”49  Because 
§ 7212(a) also punishes an “endeavor,” the Reeves court explained that using 
“corrupt” simply to mean “intentional” would make the word superfluous, 
since the court concluded that “one cannot ‘endeavor’ what one does not 
already ‘intend.’”50  The Fifth Circuit said, “‘[c]orruptly’ is a word with 
strong connotations; it is difficult to believe Congress included this ‘key’ 
word only to have it read out of the statute or absorbed into the meaning of 
‘endeavor.’”51  Instead, the Fifth Circuit found, through review of the 
legislative history, that “corruptly” was meant to forbid “those acts done with 
the intent to secure an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another.”52  
The Reeves dissent, on the other hand, argued that “corruptly” should be 
interpreted broadly.53  Judge Williams emphasized in dissent that corruptly 
is interpreted under other criminal statutes and should be interpreted in § 
7212(a) to include acts that simply have an “improper motive or bad or evil 
purpose.”54 
Reeves indicated that the “unlawful benefit” achieved is one acquired 
“under the tax laws.”55  However, this part of the Reeves decision has been 
overruled to require only any broad unlawful benefit.56  The Reeves holding 
has now been widely accepted among most circuits as the mens rea required 
 
article speculates that “[t]he government now looks to section 7212(a) in virtually every tax 
case.”  See id. at 90. 
46  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012). 
47  752 F.2d 995, 998–1000 (5th Cir. 1985). 
48  Id. at 996–97. 
49  Id. at 998. 
50  Id.  
51  Id.  
52  United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1985). 
53  Id. at 1002–04 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
54  Id. at 1002 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
55  Id. at 1000.  
56  United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 305–06 (5th Cir. 2005).  The question of 
whether or not the advantage must be financial in nature arose in United States v. Yagow, 
953 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1992), but no court has yet adopted this requirement.   
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for omnibus clause convictions.57 
Almost every tax felony and misdemeanor contains the “willful” mens 
rea standard, making § 7212 an exception with its easier-to-satisfy 
“corruptly” requirement.58  For a prosecutor to show that a crime was 
“willful,” he or she must “prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, 
that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally 
violated that duty.”59  The argument has been made that Congress intended 
corrupt intent to mean the same thing as willful intent, but courts have 
rejected this conclusion.60  The main difference between the two standards is 
the knowledge of an illegal act under the “willful” standard and the lesser 
knowledge of unlawful benefit (perhaps even obtained from a legal act) under 
the “corruptly” standard.61 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Kassouf relied on United States v. Aguilar62 when it split from other 
circuits and required a nexus test.  Since then, a majority of circuit courts 
have explicitly rejected Kassouf, and Sixth Circuit judges have been 
conflicted on the issue.  Following the development of precedent on the nexus 
test issue is important to understand its legal evolution, the arguments that 
caused the circuit split, and examples of facts that caused prosecutors to 
charge individuals under the omnibus clause. 
A. KASSOUF APPLIES AGUILAR TO NARROW THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE 
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit court to take up the question of 
whether the Government is required to allege knowledge of a formal 
investigation or proceeding in order to charge a person with tax obstruction 
under § 7212(a).63  In United States v. Kassouf, James Kassouf was charged 
 
57  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL 118 (2012) (listing cases from the 
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that have adopted the Reeves 
definition of “corruptly”); see also United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 347 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(making reference to Reeves in discussing the “corruptly” element of § 7212(a)); United 
States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1998). 
58  Jenny L. Johnson Ware, Obstruction and Obscenity: “I Know It When I See It,” 
Aug.–Sept. J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 19, 20 (2017). 
59  Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). 
60  See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
“willfulness” as a “necessary element of § 7212(a)”). 
61  Ware, supra note 58, at 21. Some courts are seemingly incorporating the willful 
standard through the use of jury instructions that require the jury to show knowledge of 
illegality while outwardly denying that the two standards are the same.  Id. 
62  515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
63  See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating “[i]ndeed no 
circuit courts have directly confronted the issue before us today . . .”).  Prior to Kassouf, 
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with three different tax crimes, including a violation of § 7212(a)’s omnibus 
clause.64  Charges under § 7212(a) were brought based on allegations that 
Kassouf had corruptly obstructed the IRS’s ability to track his personal 
financial activity because he intermingled funds between personal accounts 
and those of businesses under his control, failed to keep adequate records of 
those transactions, and omitted them from his personal tax return.65  Kassouf 
filed for dismissal of the § 7212(a) claim, arguing, among other things, that 
the prosecution had not adequately pled a violation of the omnibus clause 
because it did not allege that Kassouf had knowledge of an ongoing IRS 
investigation into his activities.66  The district court agreed that the 
prosecution had not adequately stated a claim, and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.67  The issue was brought before the Sixth Circuit approximately 
three years after the Supreme Court decided United States v. Aguilar.68  The 
district court that dismissed Kassouf’s claim applied Aguilar to limit the use 
of the omnibus clause.69 
In Aguilar, a federal district court judge, Robert Aguilar, was convicted 
by a jury of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).70  When Judge 
Aguilar’s conviction was overturned by the Ninth Circuit,71 the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to evaluate the omnibus clause in the federal 
obstruction of justice statute.72  The Ninth Circuit overturned Aguilar’s 
conviction because no evidence showed that Aguilar had the requisite 
knowledge that his testimony before investigators (the act which led to his 
conviction) would be relied upon by a grand jury.73  The Court upheld the 
Ninth Circuit’s reversal, holding that when prosecutors apply § 1503, which 
has language similar to § 7212,74 they are required to show a “nexus,”  “that 
the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with [a] judicial 
 
convictions under the omnibus clause were made without considering whether knowledge of 
an ongoing investigation or proceeding was in process.  See id. at 955–56 (listing cases).   
64  Id. at 953. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. at 954. 
67  Id. at 953. 
68  515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
69  United States v. Kassouf, 948 F. Supp. 36, 37–38 (N.D. Ohio 1996). 
70  515 U.S. at 595.  
71  See generally United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). 
72  Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 595–97.  
73  Id. at 601.  Judge Aguilar was convicted after making false statements to FBI agents 
during questioning about his disclosure of a wiretap to an individual under investigation for 
embezzling funds from a labor union.  Id. at 595–96.   
74  “Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or 
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished.”  18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).   
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proceeding[].”75  In upholding the reversal of Aguilar’s conviction, the Court: 
[E]xercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of 
deference to the prerogatives of Congress, . . . and out of concern that a fair warning 
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of 
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.76 
The Sixth Circuit applied the Aguilar reasoning in Kassouf and read a 
nexus requirement into the § 7212(a) omnibus clause.77  The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that bringing a charge of obstruction against a taxpayer who failed 
to keep adequate financial records for tax purposes, but was not under audit, 
would give the IRS broad power to prosecute speculative conduct and would 
allow authority beyond what Congress intended.78 
B. CIRCUIT COURTS BROADEN THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE 
Despite Kassouf, the federal government continued bringing charges 
against taxpayers under the § 7212(a) omnibus clause without fulfilling the 
Kassouf nexus requirement.79  By ignoring the nexus test, prosecutors paved 
the way for challenges in other circuits where taxpayers cited Kassouf as 
persuasive precedent80 as well as challenges by those being prosecuted within 
the Sixth Circuit who argued that the laws of other circuits should apply.81  
As shown below, taxpayers overwhelmingly lose when citing Kassouf in 
other circuits, and its application within the Sixth Circuit remains uncertain.82 
1. Other Circuits Disagree with the Nexus Requirement 
Other courts have continued to follow pre-Kassouf precedent or deny 
Kassouf’s nexus requirement, creating a split with the Sixth Circuit over 
whether Aguilar’s holding applied to § 7212(a).83  In the Ninth Circuit, the 
Massey decision affirmed a district court conviction where a nexus test was 
 
75  Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599.   
76  Id. at 600 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), and citing 
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77  United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998). 
78  Id. at 957–58.  The court said that to hold otherwise “would be permitting the IRS to 
impose liability for conduct which was legal (such as failure to maintain records) and 
occurred long before an IRS audit, or even a tax return was filed.”  Id. at 957. 
79  See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United 
States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1992), a pre-Kassouf opinion holding that 
§ 7212(a) only required showing that a defendant hoped for financial benefit). 
80  E.g., United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 703 (10th Cir. 2010). 
81  E.g., United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1999). 
82  See infra Introduction. 
83  E.g., Wood, 384 F. App’x at 703–04 (stating that “[i]n our view, Kassouf is not 
persuasive”). 
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not applied.84  Shane Massey was convicted under the omnibus clause after 
he refused to file tax returns for multiple years and made continuous threats 
of legal action against IRS agents who sought his compliance with tax laws.85  
The Massey court rejected the nexus test by citing a Ninth Circuit decision 
that predated Kassouf.86 
The Tenth Circuit likewise disposed of the Kassouf nexus test in United 
States v. Wood by citing Bowman, a later Sixth Circuit decision that, as 
discussed below, put Kassouf’s holding into doubt.87  The Tenth Circuit also 
rejected the similarity between § 1503(a) and § 7212(a), and agreed with 
precedent from the Ninth Circuit and other district court opinions rejecting 
the nexus test.88  A jury in a Utah district court convicted attorney Thomas 
Wood of violating the § 7212(a) omnibus clause after he used offshore bank 
accounts and foreign-issued debit cards to avoid detection by the IRS of 
taxable income that should have been reported by him and his clients.89  In 
comparing § 7212(a) and § 1503(a), the Wood court noted that § 1503(a) 
narrowly defines and even lists conduct that interferes with justice.90  Section 
7212(a), on the other hand, broadly involves impedance or obstruction of 
administration of the tax code, which could include “any arrangement that 
permits a taxable entity to avoid reporting income in the taxable year when 
earned.”91 
The First Circuit in Floyd swiftly denied the nexus requirement.92  It 
mentioned Kassouf in a footnote but denied (perhaps prematurely) that it was 
still good law in the Sixth Circuit, given Bowman.93 
The Tenth Circuit took up the issue again in its opinion in United States 
v. Sorensen.94  Jerold Sorensen was convicted of using a “pure trust” scheme 
 
84  Massey, 419 F.3d at 1010.  The Massey court made no mention of Kassouf or Aguilar 
and swiftly dismissed the nexus requirement.  Id. (“The law of this circuit establishes that the 
government need not prove that the defendant was aware of an ongoing tax investigation to 
obtain a conviction under § 7212(a) . . .”); see also United States v. Dain, 258 F. App’x 90, 
93–94 (9th Cir. 2007) (explicitly rejecting the Kassouf nexus requirement by following 
Massey). 
85  Massey, 419 F.3d at 1009. 
86  Id. at 1010 (citing United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir.1992) as 
precedent that rejected the nexus requirement). 
87  384 F. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 
595 (6th Cir. 1999)); see infra Introduction. 
88  Wood, 384 F. App’x at 704. 
89  Id. at 700–01. 
90  Id. at 704. 
91  Id. (quoting United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
92  United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2014). 
93  Id. at 32 n.4.  See infra Introduction (discussing why courts considered Kassouf to be 
overruled by Bowman and how Kassouf remains binding on the Sixth Circuit). 
94  801 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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to shield business income by using it to pay rent for his personal residence 
and business assets that had been transferred into trusts he thought to be 
undetectable by the IRS.95  Sorensen argued that the court should apply the 
Kassouf nexus test and overturn his conviction since most of the obstructive 
activity Sorensen engaged in occurred before any investigation or proceeding 
against him.96  Nevertheless, the Sorensen court followed Wood and rejected 
the nexus test.97 
A Second Circuit panel heard the issue in United States v. Marinello.98  
Carlo Marinello ran a business as a courier of documents and packages.99  He 
failed to keep adequate records of his business transactions, shredding most 
paper evidence of business activities.100  He paid his employees in cash, 
keeping no record and hampering the IRS’s ability to track their income.101  
He also paid many personal expenses using business cash.102  An IRS 
investigation had been initiated into Marinello’s business activities, but an 
agent later recommended closing it because she could not assess the 
materiality of his income.103  Marinello had no knowledge of that initial 
investigation.104  Marinello was convicted by a jury and later appealed, 
arguing that the Second Circuit should adopt the Kassouf nexus test.105  The 
court disagreed, mainly arguing that it did not find sufficient parallelism 
between § 7212(a) and § 1503(a) to justify applying the Aguilar holding to § 
7212(a).106 The court also seemed to set a new precedent in omnibus clause 
jurisprudence in explicitly holding that taxpayers could violate the omnibus 
clause through omissions, without proof of an affirmative act.107 
Although none of the judges on the Marinello panel offered a dissenting 
opinion, an en banc hearing was requested.108  The Second Circuit, having a 
reputation for very infrequently granting en banc reviews,109 unsurprisingly 
 
95  Id. at 1224. 
96  Id. at 1231. 
97  Id. at 1232. 
98  839 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2016). 
99  Id. at 211. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. at 211–12. 
103  Id. at 212. 
104  United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 212 (2d Cir. 2016). 
105  Id. at 216–17. 
106  Id. at 220–23. 
107  Id. at 225. 
108  United States v. Marinello, 855 F.3d 455, 455 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en 
banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
109  See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, The Rarity of En Banc Review In the 
Second Circuit, 256 N.Y. L.J. 38 (2016).   
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denied the request.110  However, two judges dissented from the denial.111  One 
dissenting judge wrote a powerful disagreement with the Second Circuit 
majority’s holding, acknowledging that Kassouf “is now distinctly in the 
minority” and describing the majority’s holding as “sign[ing] on to the 
emerging consensus of error in the circuit courts.”112  The dissent listed five 
of eight acts enumerated in the Marinello jury instructions113 as violations of 
the omnibus clause and attributed these items specifically to the familiar 
charge that without the Kassouf nexus test, prosecutorial abuse of the 
omnibus clause would become rampant.114  This dissenting opinion 
predominantly couched its argument in this “slippery slope” policy 
concern.115  The Supreme Court granted Marinello’s petition for certiorari116 
and heard oral argument on December 6, 2017.117 
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit took up the issue when Tamny 
Westbrooks, owner of tax preparation businesses, “grossly inflat[ed]” wage 
expenses on her tax returns.118  Prior to Westbrooks, the court had implicitly 
rejected the nexus test requirement, but had reached no conclusion on the 
persuasiveness of Kassouf.119  The Westbrooks court outright rejected 
Kassouf, noting numerous reasons why it “did not correctly interpret section 
7212(a).”120 
The First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all now refused 
to apply the Kassouf nexus requirement as outlined above.  In addition to 
these five circuits expressly rejecting Kassouf, other circuits have effectively 
rejected Kassouf by declining to include a nexus requirement as an element 
 
110  Marinello, 855 F.3d at 455 (denying rehearing en banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 456. 
113  The Marinello jury was instructed that any of eight separate acts could constitute the 
actus reus of an omnibus clause violation.  United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 213 (2d 
Cir. 2016).  Despite the dissent’s concern that committing any one of the listed acts alone 
could have resulted in Marinello’s conviction, Marinello was convicted of all eight acts.  See 
id. at 214.  Therefore, the dissent’s apprehension that any single factor on the list could 
actually meet all elements of an omnibus clause violation can be only hypothetical, since it 
was a combination of all eight factors that led to Marinello’s conviction. 
114  Marinello, 855 F.3d at 455 (denying rehearing en banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing “[i]f this is the law, nobody is safe . . .”). 
115  The dissent also briefly counters an argument made by the Second Circuit panel 
about the lack of legislative history for the § 7212(a) omnibus clause.  See id. at 459. 
116  U.S. v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, cert granted, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (U.S. June 27, 
2017) (No. 16-1144). 
117  See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 
(U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 6040470. 
118  United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2017). 
119  Id. at 322–23. 
120  Id. at 323. 
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of § 7212(a) omnibus clause prosecutions.121 
2. Bowman Walks Back Kassouf 
Less than one year after Kassouf, a Sixth Circuit panel heard a case in 
which the prosecution ignored the nexus test created by Kassouf in its 
pleadings.122  In United States v. Bowman, David Bowman was convicted 
after filing falsified tax forms meant to cause IRS investigations against 
creditors who were seeking foreclosure and judgements against him.123  On 
appeal, Bowman argued that Kassouf required the prosecution to demonstrate 
that the IRS was investigating him.124  The panel deciding Bowman not only 
refused to apply the nexus test to Bowman’s acts, but rejected the notion that 
Kassouf produced a nexus requirement at all.125  Because the Kassouf court 
left open the possibility of upholding the pre-Aguilar § 7212(a) convictions, 
despite those convictions not having satisfied a nexus standard,126 the 
Bowman court concluded that Kassouf was “limited to its precise holding and 
facts, and that it cannot be read to encompass the kind of activity for which 
Bowman was indicted.”127  In doing so, the Sixth Circuit was influenced by 
a pre-Kassouf Ninth Circuit opinion with nearly identical facts.128  Bowman 
purported to all but eliminate the nexus test as a per se rule and other circuits 
cited it as having overruled Kassouf.129 
C. SIXTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DISTRICT COURT APPLYING BOWMAN 
OVER KASSOUF 
Not only was the Bowman holding persuasive in other circuits, one 
district court within the Sixth Circuit cited it when refusing to apply the nexus 
 
121  Brief for Appellee at 13–14, United States v. Marinello, No. 15-2224 (2d Cir. Dec. 
14, 2015) (listing cases from the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh circuits). 
122  United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1999). 
123  Id. at 596–97, 599. 
124  Id. at 599. 
125  Id.  “But Kassouf did not, as Aguilar did, explicitly impose a ‘nexus’ requirement.”  
Id. 
126  “While these [pre-Aguilar] cases may provide some support for a reading of the 
statute that reaches conduct committed before a defendant was aware of a pending IRS 
action under the Internal Revenue Code, we decline to extend their holdings to reach the 
conduct involved in this case.”  United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998). 
127  Bowman, 173 F.3d at 600. 
128  Id. at 599 (describing United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992), which 
“affirmed the conviction of a defendant who had filed false 1099 and 1096 forms, the very 
activity involved in the instant case”). 
129  United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 345 (6th Cir. 2014) (listing cases from other 
circuits that “have concluded that Bowman functionally eviscerated Kassouf”). 
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requirement.130  Richard Gilbert was charged under the § 7212(a) omnibus 
clause after he “allegedly executed and mailed various fraudulent documents 
to the [IRS] in an attempt to evade payment of taxes.”131  He filed for 
dismissal, arguing that no IRS action was in process when the alleged acts 
occurred.132  Referencing Bowman, the court concluded that “[t]he most 
recent guidance from the Sixth Circuit indicates than an IRS action is not 
required.”133  The Sixth Circuit heard an appeal from Gilbert after the trial 
and affirmed Gilbert’s conviction on both counts without any consideration 
of the issue involving the Kassouf nexus test.134 
D. MINER WALKS BACK BOWMAN 
Despite other courts considering Kassouf to have been overruled by 
Bowman, the Sixth Circuit continued to selectively apply the nexus test to 
convictions under § 7212(a).135  The future of the omnibus clause nexus 
requirement and how future Sixth Circuit judges might reconcile Kassouf 
with Bowman was uncertain when United States v. Miner136 came before a 
Sixth Circuit panel in 2014. 
Miner had been convicted under the omnibus clause of § 7212(a) and 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the trial court had failed to include 
the Kassouf nexus test in the jury instructions.137  Miner had been convicted 
under the omnibus clause of § 7212(a) for sending frivolous and threatening 
letters to IRS agents on behalf of clients in an attempt to coerce changes to 
internal IRS income tax files.138  The Miner court did not expressly 
acknowledge a conflict between the two previously discussed cases, holding 
that Kassouf was controlling and upholding the validity of the nexus test 
while simultaneously declining to overrule Bowman.139  Rather, the court 
posited that Bowman might be an exception to Kassouf.140  Bowman’s future 
 
130  United States v. Gilbert, No. 3:09CR-57-S, 2009 WL 2382445, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 
30, 2009). 
131  Id. at *1. 
132  Id. at *3. 
133  Id.  
134  United States v. Gilbert, 476 F. App’x 434 (6th Cir. 2012). 
135  United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 372 (6th Cir. 2004).  McBride mentions the 
nexus test as a requirement for conviction under the omnibus clause with no mention of 
Bowman.  Id.  This omission, however, could be the result of the fact that McBride knew he 
was under investigation, and nexus was not an issue.  Id. 
136  774 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2014). 
137  Id. at 342. 
138  Id. at 339. 
139  Id. at 345 (“[W]here the rationales of Kassouf and Bowman conflict, we are bound to 
follow the former, not the latter.”). 
140  Id. at 344. 
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is less than certain though, given the Miner court’s general criticism of its 
reasoning.141 
Even though the Miner panel expressed an opinion with regards to 
Kassouf and Bowman, it was not dispositive because of the harmless error 
rule.142  The harmless error rule is a criminal appellate review standard that 
allows a reviewing court to affirm a lower court opinion when it concludes 
that an error would not have altered a substantial right of the defendant.143  
The court affirmed Miner’s conviction by deciding that omission of a jury 
instruction describing the nexus requirement was a harmless error at Miner’s 
trial.144  Ultimately, since the Miner court’s position on the nexus requirement 
issue did not result in the reversal of Miner’s conviction, future Sixth Circuit 
decisions may not be bound by Miners’s  conclusion on the nexus issue 
because this conclusion was not “necessary to the outcome,” and as such, it 
is non-binding dicta.145 
E. DISTRICT COURT WITHIN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT APPLIES MINER 
The Miner holding has been used once to apply the nexus requirement 
and uphold the dismissal of an omnibus clause charge brought in a district 
court within the Sixth Circuit.146  Fesum Ogbazion, owner of a tax preparation 
business, was charged with multiple obstructive acts, including “back-dating, 
forward-dating, and falsely signing e-file authorization forms; . . . falsely 
inflat[ing] Schedule C income [for clients],” and creating fraudulent W-2 
 
141  The Sixth Circuit stated: 
Thus, Bowman rejected Kassouf as erecting an inflexible baseline proxy test for intent—
awareness of a pending proceeding—that was under-inclusive as applied to the 
defendant in Bowman. But that is exactly the same criticism that the dissents in Kassouf 
and Aguilar had made earlier, to no avail . . . . Bowman, therefore, is largely predicated 
upon a rationale that had already lost in this court a year before it was decided. 
Id. at 344–45 (citing United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(Daughtrey, J., dissenting); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).  
142  United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 346 (6th Cir. 2014). 
143  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not 
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). 
144 Miner, 774 F.3d at 346.  The Miner court concluded that omission of the nexus 
requirement was a harmless error because it found ample evidence in the trial record 
showing that Miner was aware of an IRS proceeding against him and that correct jury 
instruction wouldn’t have altered the outcome of the trial.  Id. 
145  Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 758 F.3d 777, 781 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (“If the statement is not necessary to the outcome, it is dicta and nonbinding.” 
(citing United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2011)).  
146  United States v. Ogbazion, No. 3:15-CR-104, 2016 WL 6070365 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 
2016). 
VALCARCE_TECHNICALREVIEW2.0 4/13/18  11:06 AM 
2018] KASSOUF—MISGUIDED ATTEMPT TO REIN IN THE IRS 353 
forms for clients.147  The government did not allege that Ogbazion had 
knowledge of the investigation when he committed the obstructive acts, but 
rather argued that his company’s status as an Electronic Return Originator 
put him on notice of the likelihood of future IRS audits.148  The court 
distinguished between a “specific pending IRS action, [and] the mere 
anticipation of a routine compliance audit.”149  It held that expectation of an 
audit was not enough and that the government must show something like “a 
planned IRS audit of which [the defendant] was actually aware.”150 
III. WHY KASSOUF WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
For numerous reasons, Kassouf should be overruled in all circuits.  The 
plain text of § 7212(a) does not include a nexus test. Aguilar is not binding 
precedent and should not apply to § 7212(a).  Despite the need for a limiting 
principle to § 7212(a), courts should not apply a nexus test to a statute where 
no such test was intended. 
A. THERE IS NO TEXTUAL AMBIGUITY IN SECTION 7212(A) 
The fact that Congress specifically drafted § 7212(a) to punish corrupt 
“endeavors” to obstruct “administration of this title” demonstrates that there 
is no ambiguity within the omnibus clause, as these words have clear 
meaning.  Where there is no statutory ambiguity, courts are limited in their 
application of the rule of lenity or their examination of legislative history, 
where it exists. 
1. “Administration of this Title” Has Plain Meaning 
The phrase “due administration of this title” within § 7212(a) has 
purposefully broad application.  Congress, no doubt concerned about the 
government’s ability to collect revenue and the increasing availability of 
tools for taxpayers to avoid paying taxes, expanded the statute beyond its 
original purpose, which was to prevent force or threats of force.151  Most 
notably, Congress expanded the statute by adding the omnibus clause of § 
7212(a), which punishes “corrupt” obstruction that occurs “in any other 
way.”  Corruptly—“with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with 
official duty and the rights of others”152—obstructing administration of the 
tax code “in any other way” is definitively broad. 
 
147  Id. at *16. 
148  Id. at *17. 
149  Id. at *18 (internal quotations omitted). 
150  Id. 
151  See supra Section I.C. 
152  United States v. Winchell, 129 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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During the Sorensen trial, the Tenth Circuit surmised in its jury 
instruction that the administration of the tax code could encompass anything 
involving “carrying out [the IRS’s] lawful functions to ascertain income; 
compute, assess, and collect income taxes; audit tax returns and records; and 
investigate possible criminal violations of the internal revenue laws.”153  To 
limit the meaning of “administration of this title” sufficiently enough to infer 
a nexus requirement from the statute requires ignoring acts that corruptly 
limit certain lawful functions of the tax code as outlined in the Sorensen jury 
instruction quoted above.  The nexus test requires defendant knowledge of 
an ongoing IRS investigation or proceeding.154  Having to satisfy this 
requirement excludes any obstructive act that occurs prior to an enforcement 
proceeding or any act committed by a defendant who is not aware of an 
enforcement action. 
Thus, Kassouf’s holding effectively requires the inference that the § 
7212(a) omnibus clause was only intended to punish acts that occur while the 
IRS is “audit[ing] tax returns and records”155 or “investigat[ing] possible 
criminal violations,” as only these two items from the Sorensen jury 
instructions would satisfy the nexus test’s requirement.156  Drawing this 
conclusion from the language of the statute requires stretching beyond the 
language and inferring something that Congress did not express.  Certainly, 
if Congress meant for the § 7212(a) omnibus clause to apply only to acts that 
corruptly obstruct IRS “proceedings,” Congress could have easily added a 
few simple words to make this legislative intent known.157  Instead, Congress 
drafted the statute using the broadest language possible.  “Any other way” 
and “due administration”158 are not the words that a cautious lawmaker uses 
to limit the reach of a criminal statute.  Rather, they are carefully crafted 
terms that were more likely used for expansionary purposes, seeing as how 
the omnibus clause was created specifically for the purpose of expanding § 
 
153  United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1229 (10th Cir. 2015). 
154  United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998). 
155  It is not immediately obvious that knowledge of a civil investigation such as an IRS 
audit would satisfy the nexus requirement but the Kassouf court, in a footnote, considered 
civil proceedings to be sufficient.  See id. at 957 n.2 (defining what types of investigations 
and proceedings meet the nexus requirement: “[t]his may include, but is not limited to, 
subpoenas, audits[,] or criminal tax investigations”) 
156  See Sorensen, 801 F.3d at 1229.  
157  For example, the omnibus clause of § 7212(a) could have been drafted to punish acts 
which “corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or 
communication) obstruct[] or impede[], or endeavor[] to obstruct or impede, enforcement 
proceedings within the due administration of this title” (added hypothetical language 
emphasized).  
158  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012).  
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7212(a).159 
Furthermore, analyzing the statute and considering only the word 
“administration” shows that a nexus requirement should not be inferred from 
the statutory language.160  Administration is defined as “[t]he management or 
performance of the executive duties of a government, institution, or business; 
collectively, all the actions that are involved in managing the work of an 
organization.”161  In fact, had Congress meant to require an official 
proceeding as an element of the crime, it could have merely replaced 
“administration” with “enforcement.”  Enforcement, a term with a much 
narrower meaning, is defined as “[t]he act or process of compelling 
compliance with a law, mandate, command, decree, or agreement.” 162  It is 
the job of legislators to carefully choose the words that they use, and the fact 
that Congress used the broader term “administration,” instead of a narrower 
term like “enforcement,” indicates the breadth with which it intended § 7212 
to be interpreted. 
2. “Endeavor” is Synonymous with Attempt 
“Endeavor” is another term within § 7212(a) that is not friendly to the 
constructionists who would create a nexus requirement.  “Endeavor” means 
“[a] systematic or continuous effort to attain some goal; any effort or assay 
to accomplish some goal or purpose.”163  What is not included in the 
definition of endeavor is any mention of whether or not the “effort” yields 
success.  It is clear from this definition that one can be considered to 
“endeavor” to do something whether or not that endeavor is fruitful or in spite 
of failure.  Thus, the dictionary definition of “endeavor” can encompass both 
an act towards some end or an attempted act towards that end. 
Putting the term in the context of § 7212(a), however, requires 
separating a successful act with the attempt towards that act.  The statute says 
“obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede.”164  This shows 
that, as used in § 7212(a), “endeavor” is equated only with the attempt and 
not with the successful act.  This must be so because if “endeavor,” in the 
context of § 7212(a), refers to a successful act as well, it would render the 
 
159  See infra Section I.C (discussing the enactment of the omnibus clause). 
160  See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1129 (2015) (arguing that 
“the Federal Tax Code has long treated information gathering as a phase of tax 
administration procedure that occurs before assessment, levy, or collection”) (emphasis 
added). 
161  Administration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  
162  Enforcement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
163  Endeavor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
164  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012). 
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“endeavor” clause superfluous,165 as the immediately preceding phrase 
“obstructs or impedes” already refers to the successful act.  The clause in its 
entirety would effectively read “obstructs or impedes,” which simply means 
acts to obstruct or impede “or acts to obstruct or impede.”  Surely Congress 
did not intend to repeat the same functional phrase twice.  Thus, “endeavor,” 
in the context of § 7212(a), must refer only to attempts and could otherwise 
have been written as “obstructs or impedes, or attempts to obstruct or 
impede.”  In consideration of this meaning for the word endeavor, a nexus 
requirement cannot survive. 
Even if Congress only meant to punish an act that would obstruct or 
impede an official investigation or proceeding, an attempt to obstruct a 
proceeding does not require that an actual proceeding exist at all.  The attempt 
could be mistaken.  The Kassouf nexus test, on the other hand, requires 
knowledge of an actual investigation or proceeding.166  Therefore, the nexus 
requirement reads the word “endeavor”—as it pertains to the attempt to 
obstruct a nonexistent proceeding or investigation—right out of the statute.  
Ultimately, Kassouf eliminated the punishment of attempts that were meant 
to be within the purview of punishable offenses in the § 7212(a) omnibus 
clause. 
Justice Scalia made this argument in the Aguilar dissent.167  The 
majority in Aguilar had a more limited view of the meaning of “endeavor.”168  
The majority responded to Scalia by interpreting “endeavor” to only include 
instances where there was a proceeding and an attempt to obstruct it was 
somehow frustrated.169  In contrast, Scalia’s interpretation of “endeavor” also 
included attempts to thwart a non-existent, but anticipated, proceeding.170  In 
the majority’s own words, it defined “endeavor” as “mak[ing] conduct 
punishable where the defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, and in 
 
165  It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts should not read a statute 
in a way that makes some language of the statute superfluous to other language in the statute.  
See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009). 
166  United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “due 
administration of the Title requires some pending IRS action of which the defendant was 
aware”) (emphasis added).  
167  United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 609–12 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia further developed the argument by explaining that factual impossibility is not a 
valid legal doctrine as applied to facts in Aguilar.  Id. at 593 (“In Osborn v. United States, 
385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966), we dismissed out of hand the ‘impossibility’ defense of a 
defendant who had sought to convey a bribe to a prospective juror through an intermediary 
who was secretly working for the Government.”). 
168  Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601–02.  It is interesting to note that the majority felt it 
necessary to preemptively criticize the dissent’s argument related to the construction of 
“endeavor” before it imparted with its own definition.  
169  Id.  
170  Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
VALCARCE_TECHNICALREVIEW2.0 4/13/18  11:06 AM 
2018] KASSOUF—MISGUIDED ATTEMPT TO REIN IN THE IRS 357 
a manner that is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some way.”171  The 
Court further used an example to describe the only type of attempt it 
concluded would violate the statute: “[w]ere a defendant with the requisite 
intent to lie to a subpoenaed witness who is ultimately not called to testify, 
or who testifies but does not transmit the defendant’s version of the story, the 
defendant has endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed, 
justice.”172  On the other hand, the Aguilar majority would not, find guilt 
where a defendant, who thought he was under investigation, took all the steps 
necessary to thwart it (including force or threats of force), but it was later 
determined that no such investigation was in process.173 
Dividing the term “endeavor”—to refer to attempts that were thwarted 
but not attempts to obstruct an anticipated but nonexistent IRS action—
appears to be parsing the definition of “endeavor” to only include the element 
that molds with the desired judicial conclusion (the nexus requirement) and 
disposing of the remainder simply because the word still has “a useful 
function to fulfill.”174  This conclusion denies the plain meaning of 
“endeavor,” contrary to sound principles of statutory construction.  It is an 
important canon that words should be given their plain meaning.175  To 
partition a word’s meaning, including instances where it conforms to a 
desired policy outcome and excluding instances where it does not, is surely 
an example of a deviation from the plain meaning rule.  On this point, the 
Aguilar dissent is more persuasive than the majority opinion. 
3. Courts Should Not Apply the Rule of Lenity to Create a Nexus Test 
One premise on which Kassouf based its holding was the rule of 
lenity.176  The Supreme Court defines the rule of lenity as a requirement 
“under which we must construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the 
defendant.”177  Lenity, however, for the same reasons that make the statute 
 
171  Id. at 601–02. 
172  Id. 
173  See supra note 168 (author’s comments regarding the Aguilar majority’s treatment of 
“endeavor”). 
174  Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601 (describing Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion).  
175  “A fundamental canon of statutory construction instructs that, unless otherwise 
defined, words are interpreted to take their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning in the 
absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary.”  2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:28 (7th ed. 2011).  See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). 
176  “In construing § 7212(a) to require a pending IRS action under the code of which the 
defendant is aware, we are also mindful that courts should interpret statutes that impose 
criminal liability narrowly to ensure proper notice to the accused.”  United States v. Kassouf, 
144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998). 
177  Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 682 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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unambiguous as described below, does not apply in this situation.  The 
Supreme Court has required that the rule of lenity itself should be strictly 
construed to situations where “after considering text, structure, history, and 
purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.”178  
Even if admitting, for argument’s sake, that the Sixth Circuit outlier opinions 
demonstrate some textual ambiguity, there is little-to-no basis whatsoever on 
which to conclude that the ambiguity is “grievous.”179  This point was driven 
home during the Marinello oral argument, when Justice Kagan challenged 
the use of the rule of lenity and at one point speculated that the nexus 
requirement came “out of thin air.”180 
One Supreme Court decision is illustrative in that it declined to apply 
the rule of lenity to a different statute that was seemingly even more 
ambiguous than § 7212(a).  In the case of Reno v. Koray, a prison inmate 
argued that the definition of “official detention” within the Bail Reform Act 
of 1984181 included time spent at a treatment center during bail release.182  A 
split existed among federal circuit courts as to whether time spent at a 
treatment center counted as “official detention” time and the prisoner, Ziya 
Koray, argued that this disagreement should be viewed as ambiguity that 
warranted use of the rule of lenity in reducing the length of his sentence.183  
The Court denied use of the rule, stating “[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, 
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more 
than a guess as to what Congress intended.”184  The Court was unconvinced 
that a split of authority created such ambiguity.185  Ambiguity that exists 
within § 7212(a), if any, is comparable to that in Reno because courts don’t 
have definitive evidence of what Congress intended as evidenced by the 
circuit split.  Similar to the legal landscape in Reno, after Kassouf was 
decided, “the overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeals”186 decided 
 
178  Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
179  Grievous, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/grievous (last visited February 18, 2017) (defining “grievous” as 
“causing or characterized by severe pain, suffering, or sorrow”). 
180  Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, 22, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (U.S. 
argued Dec. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 6040470.  
181  Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. I, 98 Stat. 1976.  The referenced language was codified in 
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2001).  
182  515 U.S. 50, 53 (1995). 
183  Id. at 64. 
184  Id. at 65 (internal quotations omitted). 
185  Id. at 64–65 (“A statute is not ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity merely because 
there is a division of judicial authority over its proper construction.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
186  Id. at 53. 
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not to interpret the statute in the defendant-friendly way.187  Therefore, lenity 
is not appropriate in this context. 
4. The Legislative History is Not Helpful 
Some might argue that where ambiguity exists, courts must attempt to 
interpret legislative intent by looking to the legislative history.  Despite the 
fact that legislative history often provides little value,188 as previously noted, 
there is scant legislative history to look to in attempting to decipher the scope 
and reach of § 7212(a).189  Some, however, have argued that the § 7212(a) 
House and Senate Reports showed intent to cabin § 7212(a) towards actions 
against “specific IRS agents or investigations.”190  However, a more 
convincing interpretation of the House and Senate Reports is that they 
contain no instruction whatsoever on the omnibus clause.191  It is more 
persuasive that the reports omit any intent towards the omnibus clause 
whatsoever because the language from the Senate Report (corresponding 
with the version that was adopted) which is claimed to be instructive on the 
omnibus clause, only makes mention of “intimidation or impeding” and does 
not refer to the “in any other way” language of the omnibus clause.192  To 
 
187  See supra Section II.B.1 (describing how the majority of circuit courts have denied 
implementing the Kassouf nexus test). 
188  Justice Jackson provided an apt criticism of legislative history: 
When	  we	   decide	   from	   legislative	   history,	   including	   statements	   of	   witnesses	   at	  
hearings,	  what	  Congress	  probably	  had	  in	  mind,	  we	  must	  put	  ourselves	  in	  the	  place	  
of	  a	  majority	  of	  Congressmen	  and	  act	  according	  to	  the	  impression	  we	  think	  this	  
history	   should	   have	   made	   on	   them.	   Never	   having	   been	   a	   Congressman,	   I	   am	  
handicapped	  in	  that	  weird	  endeavor.	  That	  process	  seems	  to	  me	  not	  interpretation	  
of	  a	  statute	  but	  creation	  of	  a	  statute.	  
United States v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  See also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621(1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (disclaiming the value of Committee reports in determining 
legislative intent). 
189  See supra Section I.B. 
190  Fink & Rule, supra note 8, at 357.  
191  See Marrazzo, supra note 29, at 88; Townsend, supra note 34, at 284 n.107. 
192  The report states: 
Subsection	   (a)	   of	   this	   section,	   relating	   to	   the	   intimidation	   or	   impeding	   of	   any	  
officer	  or	  employee	  of	   the	  United	  States	  acting	   in	  an	  official	  capacity	  under	   this	  
title,	   or	   by	   force	   or	   threat	   of	   force	   attempting	   to	   obstruct	   or	   impede	   the	   due	  
administration	  of	  this	  title	  is	  new	  in	  part.	  	  This	  section	  provides	  for	  the	  punishment	  
of	  threats	  or	  threatening	  acts	  against	  agents	  of	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service,	  or	  
any	  other	  officer	  or	  employee	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  or	  members	  of	  the	  families	  of	  
such	   persons,	   on	   account	   of	   the	   performance	   by	   such	   agents	   or	   officers	   or	  
employees	   of	   their	   official	   duties.	   	   This	   section	   will	   also	   punish	   the	   corrupt	  
solicitation	  of	  an	  internal	  revenue	  employee.	  
S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 604 (1954).   
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infer Congressional intent from one disjointed paragraph contained in a 1954 
committee report which does not even quote the relevant language is to 
stretch a legal argument beyond its logical bounds.  The committee report 
cannot be determinative as to legislative intent. 
Even evidence of Congressional intent is unimportant when no textual 
ambiguity exists within the language of a statute.193  Thus, it is not 
problematic that Congress left little legislative history as guidance on how to 
apply § 7212(a) because the statute is unambiguous.  The § 7212(a) omnibus 
clause punishes any individual who “in any other way corruptly or by force 
or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) 
obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due 
administration of this title.”194  The disputed language, “due administration 
of this title” and “corruptly . . . endeavors” nowhere requires knowledge of 
an official proceeding as a prerequisite to violation of the statute.  Adding a 
nexus requirement presupposes ambiguity because of legislative intent of 
which there is no evidence based on the plain language. 
B. AGUILAR DOES NOT AND SHOULD NOT APPLY TO SECTION 7212(A) 
1. Differences Between Section 1503(a) and Section 7212(a) 
The crux of the Sixth Circuit argument that resulted in the § 7212(a) 
nexus test is the comparison of the omnibus clauses in § 7212(a) and 18 
U.S.C. § 1503(a).195  This comparison is problematic at best since § 7212(a) 
and § 1503 are two very differently structured statutes, and the omnibus 
clauses need to be structurally analyzed within their respective statutes.  The 
comparison could start and end with the statutes’ titles.  Section 7212(a) 
received the broad title “[a]ttempts to interfere with administration of internal 
revenue laws” while § 1503’s title reads more specifically “[i]nfluencing or 
injuring officer or juror generally.”  The titles indicate what the text of the 
statutes highlight, that § 7212 was written using much broader language than 
§ 1503.  In fact, § 1503 is one specific obstruction statute within a long list 
of obstruction crimes in Title 18, while § 7212 was written to encompass any 
obstruction of the entirety of Title 26.196  What is also interesting is that the 
title of § 1503 indicates that it was meant to limit the statute to the very thing 
 
193  “It is axiomatic that the starting point in every case involving construction of a 
statute is the language itself.”  Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
194  26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012). 
195  United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998). 
196  See United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2010).  The Wood court 
convincingly expressed this argument in refusing to apply a nexus test.  Id. (citing United 
States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
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that § 7212(a) was argued to have been intended to criminalize, acts against 
“specific . . . agents or investigations.”197  Section 1503, at least from reading 
its title, indicates an intention to specifically protect individuals (officers or 
jurors).  Section 7212’s title gives no such charge.  Surely if Congress had 
meant for § 7212 to replicate § 1503 in a tax setting, as the argument goes, it 
would have given it a similar title, e.g., “attempts to interfere with IRS 
officers or agents.” 
Another glaring and important difference between the two statutes is the 
inclusion of the phrase “in any other way” in the omnibus clause of § 7212(a), 
which is omitted from § 1503(a).  Inclusion of this phrase “does not seem to 
add anything other than to emphasize the broad scope of the omnibus 
clause.”198  Obstructing or impeding administration of the Internal Revenue 
Code in any other way semantically includes every possible way one could 
obstruct or impede that was not previously delineated in the statute.  From 
this, it is difficult to imagine that Congress could have chosen more 
expansive language or intended a broader application. 
Furthermore, as highlighted in Wood,199 § 1503 lists very specific 
examples of activity that constitutes punishable behavior.  For example, the 
statute bans “endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit 
juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be 
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States 
magistrate judge or other committing magistrate.”200  It also covers an 
individual who: 
[I]njures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict 
or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, 
or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his 
person or property on account of the performance of his official duties.201 
These actions are much more specific than § 7212’s broad proscription 
from acts affecting “due administration of this title.”  The differences show 
two different statutes, with two different meanings, which require two 
different interpretations. 
2. Interpretation by Comparing Statutes 
It cannot be denied that when interpreting statutes, courts often look to 
 
197  See supra Section III.A.4 (discussing an argument that Congress intended § 7212(a) 
to be limited to acts against investigators or agents). 
198  Townsend, supra note 34, at 284 n.107. 
199  United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2010). 
200  18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012).  
201  Id. 
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potentially analogous statutes to try and find similar meaning.202  However, 
the case of Bedrock Ltd., L.L.C. v. United States offers an example of the 
limitations of this principle.203  In Bedrock, landowners who were attempting 
to quiet title on land that was previously owned by the government, argued 
for the interpretation of the term “valuable minerals” in the Pittman 
Underground Water Act (PUWA) to be analogous to its interpretation of the 
term “minerals” in another federal statute, the Stock–Raising Homestead Act 
(SRHA).204  The court mentioned that the SHRA definition was useful in 
interpreting the PUWA because of “contemporaneous enactment and 
analogous purpose” but ultimately concluded that the absence of the term 
“valuable” gave the statutes two different meanings.205  Bedrock concluded 
what Kassouf denied, that two statutes that may appear to have similar 
purposes cannot be interpreted identically where Congress did not mirror the 
language in the two statutes.  The difference in the titles between § 7212(a) 
and § 1503(a) and the specificity existing in § 1503(a) that is absent from § 
7212(a) shows more than a difference of a single word.  It highlights a 
purposeful distinction between the scope of the two statutes, much like the 
term “valuable” gave the SRHA different meaning and different 
interpretation than the PUWA. 
Another argument against trying to compare § 7212(a) with other 
statutes is that different comparisons can lead to conflicting outcomes.  For 
example, comparison to the crime known as the “Klein conspiracy”206 led 
one court to conclude that no nexus requirement exists within the § 7212(a) 
omnibus clause.207  United States v. Willner discussed how conviction of a 
“Klein conspiracy” could be obtained from acts which often require no 
knowledge of an ongoing investigation, such as “active concealment of 
income by making false entries in books and records, submitting false 
documents to the IRS, and taking other affirmative acts to impede and 
obstruct the Treasury Department in the collection of income taxes.”208  The 
court considered these acts which when committed by more than one person 
constitute a “conspiracy to obstruct” to be comparable to obstruction under 
 
202  See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (“This 
appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects 
the practices of common-law courts from the most ancient times.”). 
203  314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002). 
204  Id. at 1088. 
205  Id. 
206  Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 271 in a tax context is known as a “Klein conspiracy,” 
originating from United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 
924 (1958).  See Townsend, supra note 34, at 263 n.8. 
207  United States v. Willner, No. 07 CR. 183, 2007 WL 2963711, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
11, 2007).   
208  Id. at *5 (internal quotations omitted). 
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the § 7212(a) omnibus clause, absent the requirement that more than one 
person be involved.209  In making this comparison, the Willner court denied 
application of a nexus requirement to the § 7212(a) omnibus clause.210  
Section 7212(a) cannot be subject to both Aguilar’s and Willner’s holdings.  
It should be interpreted independently. 
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE 
For the reasons articulated above, the Supreme Court should not adopt 
the Kassouf nexus test to the § 7212(a) omnibus clause as written.  However, 
without some limiting principle, there is a risk that prosecutors will continue 
to overuse the omnibus clause, charging a felony for conduct meant to be 
punished as a misdemeanor.211  The Court should appropriately interpret the 
statute as requiring prosecutors to prove an affirmative act for an omnibus 
clause violation, but the Court’s action should end there.  Congress, in its 
lawmaking role, is the appropriate body to clean up the mess that is the 
omnibus clause of § 7212(a).  Congress should decide what role the omnibus 
clause should play in future tax prosecutions and should change the language 
of § 7212(a) to limit what is arguably an unconstitutionally vague statute.212 
A. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE STATUTE AS 
WRITTEN 
Marinello presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to weigh in on 
the debate about how broadly the omnibus clause should be construed.  The 
Court should perform its role in interpreting the statute according to 
Congressional intent, regardless of policy arguments.  The Court, unlikely to 
cast the omnibus clause aside as unconstitutionally vague, is more likely to 
save the statute through some limiting principle.213  As argued above at 
length, the Kassouf nexus test should not be that principle.  Rather, the Court 
should look to the statutory scheme of tax crimes to limit omnibus clause 
charges to taxpayers who have performed an affirmative act. 
 
209  Id. at *6. 
210  Id. 
211  See Brief for American College of Tax Counsel as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 23–24, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (U.S. filed Sept. 9, 2017), 2017 
WL 4023122 (noting that failures to act under the tax code are typically misdemeanors and 
that the “Government’s sweeping interpretation of § 7212(a) would make it an outlier in an 
otherwise coherent tax enforcement system”). 
212  See id. at 5 (arguing that the government’s interpretation of § 7212(a) would make 
the statute unconstitutionally vague).  
213  See U. S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 
548, 571 (1973) (“As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, 
if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.”). 
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Prior to Marinello, some in academia assumed that activity in violation 
of the omnibus clause is limited to affirmative acts.214  This is perhaps 
because, as the New York Council of Defense Lawyers so aptly described, 
[i]n implementing Title 26, Congress sought to distinguish between acts of commission, 
which could be charged as felonies, and failures to act, which were deemed to merit 
misdemeanor charges.  With the exception of two well-defined and limited situations 
involving taxpayers performing special roles, neither of which applies in [the 
Marinello] case or the overwhelming majority of Section 7212(a) cases, tax felonies 
require willful commission of an affirmative act.215 
Furthermore, courts should interpret statutes enacted as a part of a 
statutory scheme as having the same meaning as other statutes within that 
scheme.216  For this reason, the Court in Marinello, should assume Congress 
meant the omnibus clause of § 7212(a), a felony charge, to punish affirmative 
acts only and not omissions.  This limitation, which would likely result in the 
remand of Marinello,217 is the only limit that can be provided from a strict 
interpretation of the statute. 
B. CONGRESS SHOULD RETHINK THE ROLE OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE 
Congress, having enacted an overly broad and potentially 
unconstitutional criminal felony statute, which has deprived and will 
continue to deprive individuals of their liberty, should hold hearings to 
determine what conduct it meant to be punished under the omnibus clause.  
In doing so, it should consider the plethora of case law, briefs, articles, and 
other resources that have considered this crime and the role it should play 
among other criminal provisions.  Congress may even want to argue whether 
an omnibus clause in § 7212(a) is necessary at all, given the numerous other 
criminal tax provisions within Title 26 and other obstruction charges within 
Title 18.  Regardless of the answer to these questions, Congress is the only 
appropriate channel through which these decisions should be made.  And 
given the stakes, it should act expediently. 
 
214  See, e.g., JOHN A. TOWNSEND ET AL., TAX CRIMES 92 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 2d. 
ed. 2015) (stating “affirmative action must be taken” to meet the “endeavoring” element of 
the omnibus clause).  
215  Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 10, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (U.S. filed Sept. 8, 2017), 2017 WL 
4023121. 
216  See generally 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.2  (7th ed. 2012) (explaining how statutes should be 
interpreted by reference to related statutes). 
217  Marinello arguably committed affirmative acts that may have violated the omnibus 
clause, such as destroying records, paying employees with cash, and transferring assets.  
United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2016).  
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C. EASY AND SIMPLE CHANGES TO THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE ARE 
NECESSARY 
One very simple and necessary change should be made to § 7212(a). 
“Willfully” should be substituted for “corruptly.”  This change would 
eliminate the confusion as to whether an individual has to have knowledge 
of an illegal act or broad knowledge of some unlawful gain from his or her 
act.218  It is unclear why Congress included the lesser “corruptly” mens rea 
standard, but it was probably a result of mirroring the language from other 
obstruction statutes.219  Congress should consider whether a relaxed mens rea 
standard serves any purpose at all in the prosecution of this obstruction crime, 
and it should inevitably conclude that taxpayers and law enforcement alike 
would benefit from a more certain standard. 
Congress should also consider whether the omnibus clause should be 
limited to punishing activity that obstructed a pending investigation or 
proceeding, a conclusion that is far from foregone.  In doing so, it should pay 
particular attention to Bowman, a case where the Sixth Circuit seemed so 
eager to punish the defendant under the omnibus clause, that it stretched to 
limit its binding decision in Kassouf.220  Bowman is particularly relevant to 
this decision because it adds the nuance of what punishment is appropriate 
for a taxpayer who attempts to obstruct an anticipated but not yet realized 
investigation.221  If Congress decides that the crime should contain a nexus 
requirement, it has only to substitute one word within the statute for another: 
“enforcement” for “administration.”  As discussed earlier, this would 
appropriately limit prosecutors to punishing acts that obstruct or impede 
solely the enforcement function of the IRS. 
CONCLUSION 
The Kassouf and Miner opinions have created confusion about the 
meaning of the omnibus clause of § 7212 within the Sixth Circuit and outside 
of it.  Kassouf was wrongly decided on many fronts when it applied bad 
precedent to a statute that had clear words with plain meaning.  Miner 
perpetuated the problem created by Kassouf by offering conjecture on an 
 
218  See supra Section I.D. 
219  See Townsend, supra note 34, at 283 (concluding that “[w]hen § 7212 was enacted in 
1954, it had some predicates in the prior tax law criminalizing forcible conduct to influence 
tax administration, but § 7212 was drawn virtually verbatim from the general obstruction 
provisions in the criminal code”).  
220  See United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
“Kassouf must be limited to its precise holding and facts”). 
221  Id. (explaining that Bowman’s illegal act was done “for the purpose of causing the 
IRS to initiate action against a taxpayer”). 
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issue that was not dispositive to its parties.  And in exchange for this statutory 
uncertainty, all that the Sixth Circuit seems to have achieved are a handful of 
dismissed complaints with one notable overturned conviction.222  
The Supreme Court should reject Kassouf’s nexus test.  In doing so, the 
Court should consider the weight of all the precedent in disagreement with 
Kassouf and it should apply the statute according to its very plain meaning.  
On the other hand, the Court should look to the statutory scheme of Title 26 
and limit the omnibus clause from punishing omissions by requiring some 
affirmative act.  Any other omnibus clause limitations that are necessary 
should come from Congress, after lengthy debate about how an omnibus 
clause to § 7212(a) fits into the statutory scheme.  Congress can make 
meaningful change to the omnibus clause through very minor adjustments to 
the statutory language.  Because this crime can result in serious 
consequences, Congress should act fast in order to put taxpayers on notice of 
what acts might result in a potential felony charge. 
 
 
222  Note that Kassouf’s conviction was overturned but Miner’s was not.  See supra 
Section II.C (noting that the Miner holding was not dispositive). 
